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Abstract: We analyze nonlinear pricing problem under monopoly using two hidden
types of agents with linear demands and fully characterize all possible optimal solutions
for both ordered and non-ordered demands. We show that both optimal packages can
either contain Pareto-eﬃcient quantities or one package can be undersized or oversized.
All these eﬀects are non-degenerate and are expected to hold for nonlinear demands.
Surprisingly, the total output under nonlinear price discrimination with self-selection is
neither unambigously realted to eﬃciency nor to the degree of monopoly power (demand
elasticity). We also show that under limited range of parameters quantity premia can
occur only when demands are ordered.
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I. Introduction
In this paper we analyze nonlinear pricing when a set of packages is used as self-
selection devices to identify hidden types of consumers by a monopolistic seller. Packages
are oﬀered on take-it-or-leave-it basis. Hence, although consumers self-select the size
of their choice, the quantity contained in the package is non-negotiable. Because the
monopolist, ap r i o r i ,cannot identify the hidden types of consumers, he must take into
consideration the so-called ‘incentive-compatibility’ and the ‘participation’ constraints in
designing the sizes and tariﬀsc h a r g e df o rd i ﬀerent packages. Casual observation shows
that packages are quite prevalent for many types of goods and are oﬀered in many sizes,
generally with diﬀering tariﬀs, but sometimes the observed tariﬀsa r et h es a m e . 1
Broadly speaking, the pricing of packages is a nonlinear self-selection pricing problem.2
The problem of package pricing has been analyzed in the literature, but the analysis re-
mains mostly restricted to the case when consumer valuations (i.e., their monetary beneﬁt
functions) are ordered. This assumption, sometimes named as Spence-Mirrlees-condition,
implies that the demand of one type of consumer is everywhere higher than the demand of
t h eo t h e rt y p e .F o rt h i sc a s et h eo p t i m a lp a c k a g es i z e sc a nbeo b t a i n e db yu s i n gt h e‘ c h a i n -
rule’ theorem (see Katz (1983)). Once the optimal sizes are determined, the tariﬀsc a nb e
1Southwest Airlines occasionally runs a campaign, ‘companion ﬂies free.’ Either a traveller can ﬂy
alone or take a companion with her. The fares for both options are the same.
2For a recent comprehensive treatment of nonlinear pricing, see Wilson (1993). Tirole (1988) provides
some basic models of packages for both discrete and continuous types of consumers using mainly linear
demands.
2calculated from the respective demand curves. Chain-rule simpliﬁes the solution struc-
ture considerably because each consumer ‘almost envies’ only his closest-lower-demand
neighbor and no one else and hence the incentive-compatibility constraints related only
to this neighbor’s package are binding. The standard result in this case is that, normally,
all low-demand consumers have too low consumption with zero consumer surplus, while
the highest demand consumer enjoys a positive consumer surplus by consuming a package
that is always Pareto-eﬃcient (marginal valuation equals marginal cost).
Some seemingly counter-intuitive pricing strategies observed in real life cannot be
explained by the ordered valuations assumption. For example, in the airlines industry
in the US, frequently a round-trip ticket (a bigger package) is cheaper than one-way (a
smaller package). On the other hand, some foreign airlines often times oﬀer one-way and
round-trip tickets at the same fare.3 In Japan soft-drink containers sold through vending
machines only are sometimes priced the same even though they contain diﬀerent amounts
(diﬀerent size packages). Actually diﬀerent consumers do buy both smaller and larger
containers at the same price depending on their preferences. These observed, but not yet
explained, pricing practices have provided the main impetus to analyze this problem. Our
results provide some plausible economic rationale for such observed pricing practices.
We analyze package pricing in a more general setting and allow consumer-valuations to
be either non-ordered or ordered. Ordered valuations mean that the indiﬀerence curves of
consumers cross only once, the so-called “single-crossing property.” In terms of demand it
3The authors have personally encountered both situations. When the intended journey was only one-
way the authors bought the cheaper round-trip ticket in the US and did not use the return coupon of the
ticket. In the case of foreign travel when the fares were the same the authors bought only the one-way
ticket.
3is called the “non-crossing condition,” implying that the inverse demand functions do not
cross. In reality the demand functions would intersect; for instance, when the marginal
utility of consumers whose ‘choking price’ (the willingness-to-pay for an inﬁnitesimal small
unit) is relatively high and decreases faster than that of another consumer whose choking
price is relatively smaller.4
In the non-ordered case, two diﬀerent incentive-compatible and proﬁt maximizing
packages oﬀered to two types of consumers could simultaneously be Pareto-eﬃcient and
ﬁrst-best. This striking result shows that a monopolistic nonlinear price discrimination
practiced by using packages is compatible with allocative eﬃciency. In contrast, two-part
tariﬀ and packages for all agents under ordered demands cannot contain quantities that are
all Pareto-eﬃcient, except for some degenerate cases. Further, under a special condition
two diﬀerent size packages containing Pareto-eﬃcient quantities can have exactly the same
tariﬀs. This seemingly strange result is consistent with rational behavior of consumers
when they derive some disutility in buying additional quantity.
We also show that in a non-ordered case sometimes it may be proﬁtable for the seller to
oﬀer packages containing quantity exceeding the Pareto-eﬃcient level (oversizing). This
seemingly odd result where the marginal cost exceeds the marginal payment is consistent
with optimizing behavior of the seller.5 When a package is oversized, the consumer
may choose not to buy the package. Thus, for an oversized package to be optimal for
4This seems to be the case with business and leisure travellers. The choking price for business travellers
is relatively high but their sensistivity to price is relatively low. On the other hand, the choking price for
leisure travellers is relatively low but they are more sensitive to price and their satiation level of quantity
is relatively higher. Thus the demand functions of these two types of consumers would interest at some
positive level of quantity. In real life one can ﬁnd many situations where the two demands would cross.
5Katz (1984) also shows that some consumers may consume more than the ﬁrst-best outcomes. How-
ever, his setting is diﬀerent than ours in the sense that he allows consumer to purchase multiple packages.
4the seller, an additional consideration whether a consumer has disutility or not becomes
quite important. Under linear pricing consumption is usually identiﬁed with the amount
purchased. Conceptually, this becomes questionable when a consumer buys a package on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis with some ﬁxed quantity. For example, when a consumer’s demand
is satiable, (marginal valuation can either be zero or negative) but the ﬁx e da m o u n ti nt h e
package exceeds this satiation level, then whether or not a consumer can freely dispose
excess quantity bought becomes a crucial consideration. Oversizing of package happens
either for suﬃciently large cost, or for no-free disposal situations.
Finally, there is a boundary case when the distinction between ordered and non-ordered
preferences disappears because most preferred (i.e., Pareto-eﬃcient) quantities for both
types of consumers are exactly the same. For this boundary case, a single optimal package
oﬀered to both types of consumers is Pareto-eﬃcient. Obviously, the single tariﬀ charged
will be the smaller of the two total willingness to pay.
These two eﬀects, namely the eﬃciency eﬀect and the same-tariﬀ eﬀect, arise only
under the non-ordered case. These new insights are contrary to the conventional wisdom
as they clearly demonstrate that the total output of an industry is neither unambiguously
related to its eﬃciency nor to its degree of monopolization. These eﬀects are formally
shown for linear demands. But we show latter they are expected to hold even for broader
classes of nonlinear demand functions. The reason is that the domains of parameters yield-
ing these eﬀects are solid sets. This convinces us that the domains of demand parameters
remain non-empty.
Generally, consumers who buy a larger package receive a quantity discount and pay a
5lower average price (total outlay divided by the total quantity). But it is also possible that
consumers buying a larger package also pay a quantity premium (higher average price).
Katz (1984), perhaps, was the ﬁrst to show that quantity premia for ordered demands are
possible under nonlinear pricing. Gerstner and Hess (1987), using an inventory theoretic
approach reconﬁrm that quantity premia can exist, a result similar to Katz. They also
assume that consumer’s valuations are ordered (high and low). Can quantity premium
occur for non-ordered demands? We show that when demands cross, quantity premia
cannot exist. Moreover, even within ordered demands premia can occur only for a certain
range of parameters and we completely identify the range when two demands are linear.
By restricting our analysis to two types of consumers with linear or piece-wise-linear
demands, we are able to characterize completely all optimal solutions by deriving explicit
formulas under all possible combinations of exogenously given parameters. It turns out
that, depending on diﬀerent assumptions, there could be as many as seven to ten diﬀerent
types of solutions to the problem of package sizes. For each type of solution we derive the
corresponding domain of demand parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the problem formulation for
two-consumers with linear demands. In section 3, we present the main results followed by
a discussion of the results. Using graphical approach we further show that the qualitative
results are expected to hold under nonlinear demands as well. Section 4 focuses on
quantity discounts and premia. Section 5 summarizes the main ﬁndings. The Appendix
contains outlines of the proofs.6
6Detailed proofs can be obtained at www.math.nsc.ru/˜mathecon/kokovin.html
6II. Model
Consider a case when a monopolist sells a homogeneous good using two packages to
2 types of hidden consumers, who self-select the package of their choice. No consumer
can buy more than one package, and arbitrage is prevented. To simplify the analysis we
assume all consumers of a given type choose the same package.7 Under this setting it
is suﬃcient for the monopolist to design exactly 2 packages, though some of them may
be identical in size or contain quantity equal to zero. Let the total cost function C(x)
be linear (constant returns to scale) so that the marginal cost c is a constant. Let the
n u m b e r so ft w ot y p e sb em1 and m2 respectively; their ratio is denoted by γ = m2/m1.
We assume that the utility functions are quasi-linear and depend on quantity and tariﬀ
(outlay), so no income eﬀects are present. The valuation functions Vi(xi)o ft h et w ot y p e s
of consumers are quadratic (no-free disposal case) or piece-wise quadratic (free disposal
case). In the ﬁrst case, the demand functions are linear everywhere; for the other case
they are piece-wise linear.
In the ﬁrst case, valuation functions are: V1(x1)=a1x1 − b1x2
1/2, and V2(x2)=
a2x2 − b2x2
2/2 (with parameters ai,b i > 0). The corresponding inverse demand functions
are linear: p1 = a1 − b1x1 and p2 = a2 − b2x2. All possible situations depending on the
relative sizes of demands and cost can be characterized using seven parameters, namely
c,ai,b i,m i. But the same complete characterization can be obtained using only four
meaningful parameters as a result of simple normalization. In some cases, even only three
7This assumption simpliﬁes matters, although, it may rule out some unusual optimal pricing policies.
Following another common convention, we suppose that among equivalent options, an agent chooses the
package preferred by the principal. It is reasonable because the principal may oﬀer a small reward to the
consumer for such a behavior.
7parameters are suﬃcient. It is easy to see that in most cases only the triangles of the
two inverse demand functions that are above marginal cost are relevant for the optimal
solutions. Using this observation we normalize demands by converting one consumer’s
above-marginal-cost-demand-triangle into a standard simplex described below.
Denote α =( a2 −c)/(a1 −c)( w h e na2 ≤ a1 then α ≤ 1), and β =[ ( a2 −c)/b2]/[(a1 −
c)/b1]. Set the normalized net valuations as v1(x1)=x1−x2
1/2−¯ cx1, and v2(x2)=αx2−
αx2
2/(2β)− ¯ cx2 and normalized cost ¯ c =0 . I fw en o r m a l i z et h eﬁrst consumer’s choking-
price to be 1, then the corresponding ﬁrst-best quantity for this consumer also becomes
1. Actually, the normalization (α,β), (1,1) simply changes the units of measurements.
Net tariﬀs are denoted by ti and are related to initial gross tariﬀ Ti = ti + cxi.O n ec a n
see that optimization in terms of normalized parameters is equivalent to the optimization
under the initial terms.8 Therefore, without any loss of generality and for notational
simplicity, from the very beginning we can assume net valuations as v1(x1)=x1 − x2
1/2,
and v2(x2)=αx2 − αx2
2/(2β). Further among diﬀerent cases relating (α,β)t o( 1 ,1) we
consider only those cases when α ≤ 1. T h eo p p o s i t ec a s ew h e nα > 1 can be considered
by simply renumbering consumers and renormalizing.
Formally, in terms of net tariﬀs the package-optimization problem for two consumers
c a nb ef o r m u l a t e da sf o l l o w s . 9
π(x,t)/m1 = t1 + γt2 → max
x,t s.t. (1)
v1(x1) − t1 ≥ 0; x1 ≥ 0
8Optimization with respect to gross and net tariﬀs is equivalent. For a formal proof see our paper
(2001)
9Gross tariﬀs Ti = ti + cxi and can be easily obtained from the solution.
8v2(x2) − t2 ≥ 0; x2 ≥ 0
v1(x1) − t1 − v1(x2)+t2 ≥ 0; t1 ≥ 0
v2(x2) − t2 − v2(x1)+t1 ≥ 0; t2 ≥ 0( 2 )
The above formulation has four constraints: two incentive-compatibility and two par-
ticipation constraints. When an incentive-compatibility constraint vi(xi)−ti ≥ vk(xk)−tk,
is active, then, following Wilson (1993), it can be interpreted as consumer i almost ‘en-
vying’ consumer k’choice (i → k), implying that if her tariﬀ were to be raised she would
switch. The second type of constraints vi(xi)−ti ≥ 0, usually named as participation con-
straints, state that any consumer has an option not to buy any package. In another paper
(2001) we prove that one consumer will always buy a package containing Pareto-eﬃcient
quantity, so at the optimal solution, at most, three constraints can be binding.
III. Main Results
We now present the results for both no-free and free disposal cases. In explaining
some special cases our analysis assumes that there is at least an inﬁnitesimally small
transaction cost to the seller. Our immediate goal is to characterize the domain of four
crucial parameters (α,β,γ,c) ≥ 0t h a ty i e l dd i ﬀerent optimal solution structures.
In presenting results, if a package contains a quantity larger than an agent’s locally
Pareto-eﬃcient level (EQ)w el a b e li toversized (> EQ). When the seller ﬁnds it optimal
to oﬀer a package to only one type of consumers and ignore the other type (i.e., xi =0 ) ,
then the solution is labeled as ignoring solution.
For the sake of the expositional clarity, the no-free disposal case is considered ﬁrst.
9A. No-free Disposal
Conceptually, no-free disposal implies that a consumer derives disutility from buying
additional quantities beyond her satiation level. For example, a consumer may not like
to buy and carry a big bottle of soft-drink when she is not very thirsty. This may also
be the case when a person taking a short vacation do not want to carry larger packages
of toothpaste, shaving cream, etc. due to storage considerations and hence because of
disutility smaller packages may be preferred.
For no-free disposal case, as well as for large c, Proposition 1 below characterizes all
optimal solutions.
PROPOSITION 1. For two consumers each having a linear demand and no-free dis-
posal or c ≥ 1, all possible optimal solutions to the package pricing problem lie within
the seven regions deﬁned by the parameters in Table 1 and depicted in Figure 1.
[Table 1 and Figure 1 here]
10Table 1. Optimal Solution Structures for No-Free Disposal Case
Regions Active consraints Package Sizes
A:
1










γ+1,β ≤ 1 1→2=0, 1→0 x1 =1 ,x 2 =0( Ignoring)
D:m a x {1,
2γα+α−γα2−α2
1−α+γα } ≤ β, 1→2→0, 1→0 x1 =1 ,x 2 =2 β
1−α
β−α >E Q
β ≤ 2 − α
E:2− β ≤ α ≤
β
2β−1 1→0, 2→0 x1 =1 ,x2 = β
F:
β
2β−1 ≤ α ≤ ¯ α(γ,β) 2→1→0, 2→0 x1 =2 β
1−α
β−α <E Q ,x 2 = β
G:¯ α(γ,β) ≤ α < 1 2→1→0 x1 = β
(γ+1−γα)

















For regions I1, D, E t1 =
1
2, and it is the same for all three regions. For other regions
the tariﬀsa r e :
t2I =0 ,t 2D =2 β (1 − α)α
β−1
(−β+α)2, and t2E = αβ/2
t1F =2 β (1 − α)α
β−1
(β−α)








10Recall that gross tariﬀs are obtained from these net tariﬀsa sTi = ti +cxi.
11Proof. We only give the outline of the proof in the Appendix. Detailed derivations
are available (see footnote 6).
We explain Table 1, and Fig. 1. There are seven formulas for diﬀerent solutions
related to diﬀerent sizes of (α,β) demand triangle (α is the height and β is the length).
The related regions are labeled anti-clockwise A through G.E a c hr e g i o ni si d e n t i ﬁed by
the active constraints, i.e., those constraints becoming equalities. For instance, notation
1 → 2 → 0 means that the ﬁrst consumer is almost-envying the second one, who is almost
inclined not to buy, while 2 = 0 would mean she actually does not buy. In regions A and
I1, β ≤ 1. Therefore these two regions represent the ordered case. The other ﬁve regions
where β ≥ 1 represent the non-ordered case. As identiﬁed in Table 1, all boundaries
separating one region from the other are supposed to belong to both regions. In particular,
the border point [β =1 , α =1 /(1 + γ)] belongs to all four neighboring regions, namely
A, I1, B, D.11 Since the consumers can be renumbered and renormalized, the line [β > 1,
α =1 ]i se q u i v a l e n tt ol i n e[ β < 1, α =1 ] , and therefore is excluded from our results.
T h el i n e[ α =0 ]a n dp o i n t s[ α =1 , β = 1] are also excluded as pathological cases as they
pertain only to one type of consumers. Within each region, we also include ﬁgures of the
two demand triangles that approximate the related areas of two demand triangles for the
two types of consumer. White triangle, with height 1 and length 1, relates to the ﬁrst
consumer, while the grey triangle with height and length α, β respectively is related to
the second consumer.
11For the line α = 1
γ+1 and line β =1 ,α < 1
γ+1 only one package can be expected in practice. The
reason being that the seller prefers pne package over a more complicated two-package scheme, though
formally both strategies are optimal, giving the same proﬁt.
12Note that the regions with respect to active constraints follow a logical order. The
Pareto eﬃciency region E occupies the central position. It relates to participation con-
straints 1 → 0,2 → 0 which are active at the solution. None of the incentive-compatibility
constraints are active in region E. This implies that the demand parameters are such that
the two demand triangles, shown within the region E, are more or less equal in areas.12
In particular, the curve αβ =1 , which is approximately in the middle of this region,
implies that the areas of two triangles are exactly the same. Since incentive-compatibility
constraints are not active, no consumer envies each other’s package. In this case, two
diﬀerent size packages can be sold for the same net tariﬀs. Either disutility, or zero utility
from larger than the desired packages ensures this result. The more diﬀerent the demand
triangles, the less likely would be such an outcome.
L e tu sm o v ec l o c k w i s ea r o u n dt h ep o i n t( α,β)=( 1 ,1). By decreasing α and β we
reduce the area of the grey triangle and get the region D w h i c hi st ot h el e f ta n db e l o wt h e
Paretian region E. Here the incentive-compatibility constraint 1 → 2, the ﬁrst consumer
envies the second, (i.e., temptation to switch to second consumer’s package becomes
stronger) becomes active and the participation constraint 1 → 0r e m a i n sa c t i v e . S oa
solution satisfying constraints 1 → 2 → 0,1 → 0 results. Farther to the left, in region B,
the incentive-compatibility constraint 1 → 2 becomes so strong that the other constraints
become redundant, giving the solution 1 → 2 → 0. Similar logic works to the right of the
Paretian region. In region F, the area of the white triangle becomes suﬃciently less than
the area of the grey triangle, and for the second consumer the temptation to switch to
12Gross tariﬀ T1 includes the area of the white triangle (net tariﬀ) and the costs cx1. Similarly, gross
tariﬀ T2 includes the area of grey triangle and costs cx2.
13ﬁrst consumer’s package becomes stronger, making the incentive-compatibility constraint
2 → 1 active, while the participation constraint 2 → 0 remains active. In region G the
incentive-compatibility constraint 2 → 1 becomes so strong that it is the only one that
is active. When the areas of the demand triangles are very diﬀerent, as it is the case in
region G, only one type of consumers matters. Thus in essence, the result in region G,
is very similar to the ordered demands case A.
B. Free-disposal case
In many situations free disposal may be more typical.13 Although most results shown
for the no-free disposal case above also hold under free disposal, for the sake of complete-
ness we analyze this case separately. The formulation is modeled with piece-wise linear
demands with a kink at the satiation point. At the kink (zero price) the inverse demand
function becomes horizontal.
In the no-free disposal case we normalized marginal cost to zero, though our formulas
do work for positive cost c>0 as well. However, to formally incorporate free disposal we
need to make some modiﬁcations by considering costs explicitly.
From intuitive reasoning it is clear that the initial non-normalized linear demand
functions for the two consumers with free disposal are:
p2(x)=m a x {0,(α+c)−x(α+c)/β}. p1(x)=m a x {0,(1+c)−x(1+c)}.14 The related
valuation functions,revealed from demands, become piece-wise quadratic.
13The obvious example is when a consumer does not derive any disutility by not using the return-ﬂight
coupon of a round-trip airline ticket. Many other examples from real life can be given.
14These statements simply states that there cannot be any disutility. Compare it with no-free disposal
function p2(x)=( α+c)−x(α+c)/β where marginal utility can be negative. Note that as before, (α+c)
is the chocking price, that is, the price at which an inﬁnitesimally small quantity will be bought.
14V1(x)=[
(1 + c)x − x2/2w h e n x ≤ 1+c
(1 + c)2/2w h e n x ≥ 1+c
V2(x)=[
(α + c)x − αx2/(2β)w h e n x ≤ β α+c
α
(α+c)2
2α β when x ≥ β
α+c
α .
For the statement of the proposition 2, it is convenient to reformulate the package
problem in terms of net valuation functions vi and net revenues. This reformulation simply
amounts to subtracting cx from the valuation functions and tariﬀs: vi(x): =Vi(x) − cx,
ti(x): =Ti(x) − cx.
We state the main results for the free disposal case in terms of vi(x),t i(x)i nt h e
following proposition. As before, all formulas are in terms of net tariﬀs.
PROPOSITION 2. Under free disposal all possible optimal solutions to package
pricing problem lie in ten regions depicted in Figure 2. Four regions A, I1, F, G as
stated in Table 1 remain the same, and six regions B, C, D, E, H, I2 are stated in Table
2.
[Table 2, Figure 2 here]
15TABLE 2. New Solution Structures for Free Disposal Case
Regions Active constraints Package sizes
B:1≤ β ≤ min{
2γα+α−γα2−α2




C: αign(β,c,γ) ≤ α, 1 → 2 → 0 x1 =1 ,x2 >E Q
α
γ+1+cγ+c





I2: α ≤ αign(γ,β,c),
(1+c)2
4c ≥ β ≥ 1 1 → 2=0 x1 =1 ,x2 =0
D: β ≥
2γα+α−γα2−α2





β } ≥ α ≥
β(1−c)
2β−1−c
H: 0 < α ≤ max{2 − β,
(1+c)2−2cβ
β }, 1 → 2 → 0,1 → 0 x1 =1 ,x 2 >E Q
except α,β in B, C, I2, D
E:
β
2β−1 ≥ α,β ≥ 1 1 → 0, 2 → 0 x1 =1 ,x 2 = β
α ≥ max{2 − β,
(1+c)2−2cβ
β }














All sizes and tariﬀs for Table 2 are the same as in Table 1, except for the two new
regions C and H which are given below.
Region C: x1 =1 ,x 2 =
β(γα−1+α)

























16Proof. We give the outline of the proof in Appendix. Detailed derivations are available
(see footnote 6).
We brieﬂy explain Table 2 and Figure 2. Instead of seven regions under no-free disposal
case we now have ten regions. Comparison with Fig.1 shows that regions A, I1, F, G
remain unchanged. The reason is that since there are no oversized packages in these
regions, they are not aﬀected by free disposal. Pareto-eﬃcient region E becomessomewhat
smaller; its lower bound is slightly higher, for β > 1+c.
The logical order of regions around the Paretian region E remains essentially the same
as in the no-free disposal case discussed earlier. It can be added that the region D now
is split into two regions, D and H, having the same active constraints 1 → 2 → 0,1 → 2,
but diﬀerent formulas for package sizes. Now instead of one region, B, with constraint
1 → 2 → 0, there are two regions, B and C.I ns o m es e n s e ,r e g i o nB can also be viewed
as an extension of region A b e c a u s ei th a st h es a m ea c t i v ec o n s t r a i n t1→ 2 → 0a n d
formulas. New region I2 is just an extension of region I1 emerging due to similar reasons.
Few observations about how changes in parameters aﬀect the results are worth men-
tioning. For large marginal cost c ≥ 1, Fig.2 converges to Fig.1 of the no-free disposal
case. In another case, as c → 0, the lower border of the eﬃciency region E converges to the
same-net-tariﬀ line (α =1 /β), and the ignoring solution region I2 takes up most of the
space below this line, replacing parts of regions E, H, C, D, and B. In contrast, changing
the ratio γ keeps the number of regions intact but changes their areas signiﬁcantly. For
instance, as expected, large γ decreases the area of region I2 (ignoring solution), while
for a smaller γ this region becomes relatively larger. These observations are also true for
17the no-free disposal case.
C. Discussion of the results
We discuss results in terms of net valuation function vi(x)=( Vi(x) − cx)w h i c h
represents the consumer surplus had the consumer paid the price equal to marginal cost
c for the quantity x. This net valuation can also be viewed as the potential proﬁtf r o m
this consumer. In the case of zero marginal cost, it is exactly the consumer’s valuation.
We discuss Pareto eﬃciency and same-net-tariﬀ eﬀect ﬁrst. The main reason why
eﬃciency occurs is due to the equality or approximate equality of net valuations for the
eﬃcient quantities x∗
i ( i.e., quantities which satisfy the equality MRSi = MRT)o ft h e
two types of consumers. For linear demands, such equality holds when x∗
2 = β and x∗
1 =1 .
In the parameters space the equality of net-valuations is represented by the same-net-tariﬀ
line, v2(x∗
2)=αβ/2=1 /2=v1(x∗
1), that goes through the middle of the Paretian region
E. A consumer decides which package to buy by comparing the net tariﬀ with her net
valuation. On the ‘same-net-tariﬀ line’ the net tariﬀs are the same for two consumers and
they also equal to their net valuations. As a result switching to another package is not
desirable. Although two consumers have the choice between two diﬀerent packages at the
same (net) tariﬀ, each consumer will self-select her most-preferred quantity x∗
i that results
in Pareto-eﬃciency. This provides a plausible explanation for pricing diﬀerent soft-drink
bottles in Japan at the same price and foreign airlines charging one-way and round-trip
the same fare. In both cases, marginal costs are small, so the gross tariﬀsd on o ts e r i o u s l y
diﬀer from the net tariﬀs.
Now consider situations below the same-tariﬀ line αβ/2=1 /2 where net valuations
18as well as net tariﬀsd i ﬀer in the sense that t2 <t 1 but not by too much. Here the seller
must take into account the possibility of switching by the ﬁrst consumer (who is buying
a smaller package) to a larger package . The consumer will not switch under no-free
disposal assumption, because although tariﬀsd i ﬀer slightly, disutility may be signiﬁcant.
On the other hand, when the costs are positive, the total tariﬀ becomes larger because of
larger quantity. Hence the costs play the same role as disutility in discouraging the ﬁrst
consumer from buying a larger than the desired package. Thus for situations below the
same-net-tariﬀ line αβ/2=1 /2, but α ≥ 2 − β, either disutility or large costs, or both,
are enough for Pareto-eﬃciency. In the absence of signiﬁcant costs or disutility, the region
below the same-net-tariﬀ line cannot be Pareto-eﬃcient. As c → 0, the lower border of
the eﬃciency region coincides with the same-tariﬀ line .
In contrast, the existence of Pareto eﬃciency for the region above the same-tariﬀ line
does not depend upon costs or free disposal, because switching from the most-preferred
quantity to a smaller package at the same price can never be desirable. Thus, the region
of Pareto eﬃciency is rather broad, always having a non-zero measure; therefore, it is not
a pathological case.
At least at the Paretian solution the seller captures the whole surplus as proﬁtf o r
linear demands (it is likely to hold for non-linear demands also). Thus the ﬁrst-best
solution is attainable in spite of the fact that the consumer types are hidden. Asymmetric
information does not result in any eﬃciency loss!
Oversizing eﬀect is more likely to occur when the choking price of the second consumer
is suﬃciently lower than that of the ﬁrst consumer, and at the same time the area under
19her demand curve is not too large (see regions B, C, D, H). When this is the case, the
ﬁrst consumer buys a smaller package but pays a larger net tariﬀ. For this case, to prevent
the ﬁrst consumer from switching to a larger and cheaper (in terms of net tariﬀ) package,
the seller must choose between two alternatives. Either ignore the second consumer
altogether or make her package oversized. When there is no-free disposal or large costs,
and the demand of the ﬁr s tc o n s u m e ri ss t e e p e r( i th o l d sf o rl i n e a rd e m a n d s ,b u tm a y
also hold for non-linear demands), then oversizing the package becomes more proﬁtable.
Indeed, there exists a suﬃciently large quantity x2 at which the second consumer’s net
valuation of the package size still remains positive, but because of disutility or costs, the
net valuation of the ﬁr s tc o n s u m e rf o rx2 is reduced to zero. This prevents switching by
the ﬁr s tc o n s u m e rt ot h eo v e r s i z e dp a c k a g ex2,a n da tt h es a m et i m et h es e l l e re a r n ss o m e
positive proﬁt from the second consumer by not ignoring her. This can be explained by
Figure 3. Here the lightly shaded area S1 is what the ﬁrst consumer gains if she switches
from x1 = 0 to another package S2 ≥ β while the darker area S2 is what she looses. The
equality S1 = S2 represents the optimality condition for the package sizes for the seller.
Note that x2 is high enough to prevent switching, but it is not too high. The upper part
of S1 shows the gain in consumer surplus from switching if optimal size for the second
p a c k a g ew e r et ob ex2 = β.
Why do no-free disposal assumption and large costs have similar eﬀects on optimal
packages? Essentially, the diﬀerence between free-disposal and no-free disposal cases lies
in whether the demand function switches to zero or not at the zero-price line. When costs
are high enough then the optimal quantities are relatively smaller than the corresponding
20quantities representing the switching points. In this case, free-disposal or not makes no
diﬀerence for solutions; thus high costs work the same way as no-free disposal. In contrast,
free disposal with (almost) zero cost prevents oversizing. Because in this case it is more
proﬁtable to ignore one consumer altogether. Except for the oversizing issue, free disposal
assumption essentially plays no major role.
It is important to stress that the demand parameters α,β aﬀect the qualitative features
of solutions in Table 1 quite diﬀerently than parameter γ.15 Parameters α,β are the sole
determinants of the basic tree-structure of the solution as well as oversizing or undersizing.
In contrast, γ do not inﬂuence basic solution structure or oversizing, but it adds only
additional arcs to the tree in some cases. It means that basic features of solution remain
independent by the numbers of any consumer type and do not vary when population of a
particular type increases or decreases. At the same time, the size of packages, and amount
of tariﬀs, discounts and premiums are determined by all three parameters α,β,γ.
Our results mentioned above provide some plausible economic rationale or lack of
it for some pricing strategies mentioned earlier. In particular, the US airlines industry,
where a round-trip ticket is cheaper than one-way, does not represent a standard optimal
solution, because free disposal is possible. Such price-quantity bundles can be rational
on two grounds. It seems probable that very few consumers are buying one-way ticket
and they are not well informed. Then in essence this pricing policy represents the “ig-
noring” solution (region I1 or I2 in Table 2). The seller, in principle, oﬀers only one
optimal package, namely round-trip; the one-way-high-price option is exercised only by
15More detailed derivation of comparative statics of solution w.r.t. γ see the Appendix.
21the uninformed customers.
D. Nonlinear demands
We have derived our results using linear demands. The linearity assumption was useful
in deriving exact formulas that explicitly characterize all regions. However, qualitatively
all these results also hold even when the demands are nonlinear. Figure 4 demonstrates
this fact. Consider the quantity-tariﬀ curves Vi(x) − ti = 0 related to net valuations (or
zero costs) so that the maximal point is partially eﬃcient. On the ﬁrst consumer’s (thick)
indiﬀerence curve V1(x) − t1 = x1 − x2
1/2 − t1 = 0, the maximum point is at x1 =1 ,
t1 =1 /2. Let us draw the second consumer’s (dotted) indiﬀerence curve, V2(x) − t2 =
αx2 − αx2
2/(2β)− t2 w.r.t (α,β)s ot h a ti t sm a x i m u mi sa tx2 = β,t 2 = αβ/2. When the
maximum given by the dark circle is above t = x−x2/2a n db e l o wt = x2/(2x−1) then we
have the Pareto eﬃcient solution depicted in region E. This is so because both consumers
almost envy to 0. For this case the seller can behave as if he has full information and
information asymmetry does not prevent in obtaining the ﬁrst-best solution. However,
when the maximum (β, αβ/2) goes below the thick indiﬀerence curve, such eﬃcient
solution becomes impossible because the ﬁrst consumer would switch to second consumer’s
package (x2 = β,t 2 = αβ/2) and would derive more utility. Similarly, when the maximum
(β, αβ/2) happens to be above the curve t = x2/(2x − 1) one can see that reverse envy
occurs: the ﬁrst consumer’s maximum x1 =1 ,t 1 =1 /2 lies below the second consumer’s
indiﬀerence curve and hence the second consumer would switch to ﬁrst consumer’s package
(1,1/2) because it gives more surplus. Following this logic we can conclude that any two
net valuation functions Vi(x) would result in Pareto eﬃcient packages if and only if each
22maximum (xi,t i) of the normalized indiﬀerence curve Vi(x)−ti =0is not below the other
curve.
Similarly four other parameter zones, separated by the solid line and labeled in accor-
dance with Fig. 1, show the cases of undersizing, oversizing and ignoring solutions. Thus
qualitatively our results can be generalized for non-linear demands.
Figure 4 helps us to demonstrate that the qualitative eﬀects namely eﬃciency, over-
sizing and undersizing are quite general and do not depend on the linearity assumption
of demands. Indeed, when one transforms the V1 and V2 curves in such a way that both
maxima remain in similar position (above or below) with respect to other curve then the
qualitative eﬀects mentioned in the paper would remain intact.
IV. Quantity Discounts and Premiums
In this section we present the results related to quantity discount or premium.
Deﬁnition. For two packages i, j with total tariﬀs Ti,T j and quantities xi,x j quantity
premium (discount) is deﬁned by relation Ti/xi >T j/xj (Ti/xi <T j/xj)f o rxi >x j.
Under the ordered demands case, Katz (1984), in a diﬀerent setting than ours, shows
the existence of quantity premia.
For linear demands we characterize the entire region of parameters yielding premium.
Note that the region for premium also has a non-zero measure and the existence of a
premium is not a pathological case. The region of premium happens to belong to ordered
demands case only.
PROPOSITION 3. For two consumers with linear demands all optimal solutions to
package pricing problem giving discounts or premiums are stated in Table 3.
23Table 3.
Regions Results
in A: α <
β−βγ+γ
1+γ ,1 > α >
1
1+γ,β ≤ 1,γ > 1 Premiums
in A: α =
β−βγ+γ
1+γ Same price
All other cases Discounts
I1,I2: 0 < α ≤
1
γ+1,β ≤ 1a n dβ =1 One package∗
∗For the line α =
1
γ+1 one package actually occurs when the seller prefers it to a more
complicated two-package scheme, though formally both strategies are optimal giving the
same proﬁt.
Proof Available from authors (see footnote 6).
In Fig.1 and Fig.2 the regions for premium are the dark triangles shown within the
region A. T h eh o r i z o n t a ll i n ei s1 /(1 + γ). The sloped line is
β−βγ+γ
1+γ . Note that this
domain of parameters α,β yielding premia is non-empty if and only if γ is greater than
1( m2 >m 1). Furthermore, as γ increases the area of domain of parameters α,β yielding
premium also increases. Therefore, for a very large γ, the probability of premium for
ordered demands is almost 1/2 under a uniform distribution.
The intuition behind only discounts for the non-ordered case can be explained graphi-
cally in terms of demand triangles. For region E the average price (in terms of net tariﬀs,
which gives the same discount index as gross tariﬀs, see proof in the appendix) is the av-
erage height of the triangle. Consequently, the lower triangle must have a smaller average
price, yielding discount. Similarly for all lower regions D, B, C,a n dH the average price
is even less than the average height of a triangle, yielding discount. Similar arguments
apply to regions G,a n dF.N o t et h a tf o rx1 the average price is the average height of a
24trapezoid which is more than 1/2, while for x2, because α < 1, the average height of a
triangle is less than 1/2.
V. Conclusions
For two types of consumers with linear-demands we have presented a complete analysis
for both non-ordered, and ordered demands. Our analysis provides several new insights.
First, in spite of asymmetric information, Pareto eﬃciency can exist under monopoly with
hidden types of agents and socially optimal output could be produced . This usually never
is the case with most other nonlinear pricing strategies and normally it is also not the case
when demands do not cross. Second, the consumption level of one type of consumer can be
ineﬃciently high due to oversized package. Third, under non-ordered demands consumers
always enjoy quantity discounts. Quantity premia can occur only when the demands are
ordered and low-demand consumers are more numerous. Finally, the qualitative eﬀects
also hold for non-linear demands.
25Appendix
Outline of the proof for Proposition 1.
We provide the basic steps in deriving optimal solutions for the regions in Table 1.
From a general ‘tree-theorem’ established in our other paper (2001), it follows that it
is suﬃcient to study only three logically possible systems of active constraints namely
[1 → 2 → 0], [2 → 0,1 → 0] and [2 → 1 → 0], including also their subcases [2 → 1 → 0,
2 → 0], [1 → 0,1 → 2 → 0]. For each system we ﬁrst derive expressions for xi,t i from the
constraints that are supposed to be active. By the same ‘tree-theorem’ the non-envied
consumer must consume Pareto-eﬃcient quantity, i.e., x1 =1f o r[ 1→ 2 → 0], and
x2 = β for [2 → 1 → 0]. Then substitute these expressions into the remaining (non-
active) constraints and into the objective function. After this substitution there remains
only one variable to optimize, namely x1 for [2 → 1 → 0], and x2 for [2 → 1 → 0]. The
non-active constraints (or, more precisely, the constraints not included into the system)
can all be expressed in terms of admissible intervals for the optimizing variable.





2β and the admissible intervals are [0 ≤ x2 ≤
α+β−2αβ
β−α or
1 ≤ x2 ≤
2β(1−α)
β−α ]. This domain can be shown to be non-empty only for parameters
(α ≤ β/(2β − 1)) below regions F,a n dG. By maximizing the objective function on this
domain we obtain either unconstrained solutions related to regions A and B,o rb o r d e r
solutions related to some not-in-system constraint becoming active. For ordered demands
(β ≤ 1), it turns out that this new active constraint can only be the positivity constraint
( l e f tb o r d e ro ft h ed o m a i n )r e s u l t i n gi nr e g i o nI1 (ignoring solution). For the non-ordered
26demands (β > 1), it turns out that the not-in-system constraint becoming active can only
be the constraint [1 → 0] (the right border of the domain). This results in region D and
solutions of the type [1 → 0, 2 → 1 → 0].
For [2 → 1 → 0] the steps are exactly the same, giving regions F, G.
For [1 → 0, 2 → 0] the quantities x1,x 2 must be Pareto-eﬃcient because no consumer
envies other consumer’s package: x1 =1 ,x 2 = β. Substituting these values into the
incentive-compatibility constraints we obtain the region E of parameters α,β and make
sure that incentive-compatibility constraints are satisﬁed. In this region other bundles
may also be admissible, as shown in analyzing systems [1 → 2 → 0], [2 → 1 → 0].
However, because Paretian solution is the ﬁrst-best solution, the other possible bundles
need not be considered in this region. ||
O u t l i n eo ft h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
The proof is long and tedious requiring symbolic-algebra software to handle high-
degree polynomials. Very brieﬂy the idea is as follows.
The initial optimization problem has two threshold functions V1(x1),V 2(x2)o rs w i t c h e s
applicable to all constraints. Both functions switch from a parabola to a line. First
one at point x1 =1+c, while the second switches at x2 = β
α+c
α . By normalizing the
functions to net valuations and using other transformations, the problem is reduced to
some other equivalent optimization problem having only one switch point x1 =1+c.
Then optima can be studied separately both to the left and to the right from this switch
point for the same three systems of constraints as in the no-free disposal case. Finally,
solutions to the left and to the right from x1 =1+c can be compared to ﬁnd the highest
27proﬁt solution. However, direct comparison results in excessively tedious polynomials. To
compare diﬀerent solutions, some indirect ways based on the concavity or convexity of
the objective function on the admissible intervals (revealed from non-active constraints)
are used.
O u t l i n eo ft h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3( f o rp r e m i u mo n l y ) .
We can focus on net revenues ti only because actual tariﬀs Ti(x)=ti(x)+cxi,
have the same discounts (or premiums) index: ∆[region](α,β)=t2/x2 − t1/x1 < 0 ⇔
T2/x2 − T1/x1 < 0. This index means discount when x2 ≥ x1, and it means premium
in the opposite case. To obtain parameters yielding either discount or premium, we just
take formulas of optimal quantity-tariﬀ packages from Tables 1 and 2 and directly sub-
stitute them into this discounts/premiums index. We do this for all described regions of
parameters α,β, for both the no-free disposal and free-disposal cases.
Premium can exist only in region A [1 > α > 1
γ+1,1 ≥ β ].
From Table 1 we have,
x2 =
γα−1+α
γα−β+αβ and x1 =1s ox2 ≤ x1. The tariﬀsa r e
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28The numerator is negative when (α(1 + γ) − (β − βγ + γ)) < 0 ⇔ α <
β−βγ+γ
1+γ .
We are studying interval α > 1
1+γ. These two inequalities are consistent iﬀ 1 < β −
βγ + γ giving the solution {signum(γ − 1)β < signum(γ − 1)}.
Note that when (γ − 1) < 0a n dβ ≤ 1 we have a contradiction. Thus, for the case
[γ < 1,α > 1
1+γ]w eh a v e t2
x2 − t1
x1 > 0, that means quantity discount everywhere. In the





1+γ]. In the remaining part of region A we have only discount.
All other regions of parameters can be analyzed the same way, or one can use the
geometric reasoning given above. It turns out that, except for region A, all other regions
have discount. Only for some boundary cases average price paid by the two consumers is
the same (i.e., zero discount).
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FIG.1.Regions of different solutions with large costs or without free disposal,  = 2, c > 1.  
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FIG.2. Regions of different solutions with free disposal and small costs  = 2, c = 0.5.  
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FIG 3. Oversizing effect with non-ordered (crossing) demands, with free disposal 
(dashed-lines extensions of demand curves), without free disposal (kinked lines).  1 
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FIG 4.   Efficient-quantity/tariff zones yielding different outcomes. 
 